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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARLENE NOLEN, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
v. : CaseNo.20050877-CA 
JUDY HAMAKER-MANN, Director, : 
Utah State Driver's License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Arlene Nolen filed a petition for judicial review of the informal adjudicative 
proceeding that resulted in the suspension 6f her driver's license in the Second District 
Court. R. 1-6. The district court's order denying her petition was filed on September 12, 
2005. R. 27-32. Ms. Nolen filed her notice of appeal on September 20, 2005. R. 36. 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) (appeals from district court decisions on petitions for judicial 
reviews of informal adjudicative proceedings). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. On appeal, petitioner relies upon her own testimony that was found to be not 
credible by the district court. Nolen has failed to meet her burden of marshaling the facts 
that support the district court's credibility finding. Due to the petitioner's failure, this 
Court should accept the district court's findings on appeal. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW. This issue is 
unique to the appeal and does not require the review of any decision of the district court. 
2. The district court accepted Officer Parkin's testimony, over that of petitioner, 
that Ms. Nolen was intentionally failing to provide an adequate sample for the 
breathalyzer test. Given this factual finding, the district court correctly upheld the 
agency's decision to suspend her driver's license. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised at the bench trial and was 
the basis for the district court denying the petition. Tr. 45-47, 58-63.' 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's findings of fact are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Save Our Schs. v. Bd. of Educ. 2005 UT 55,1fl[8-9, 
122 P.3d 611 ("The trial court's factual findings will not be considered clearly erroneous 
unless they are 'not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.'"). The district 
1
 The transcript of the bench trial was not paginated as part of the record. 
Citations to the transcript are by the page of the transcript only. 
2 
court's conclusions of law drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo. Drake v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997) (normally district court's application of facts to 
legal rule reviewed for correctness in absence of special circumstances that would 
indicate a more deferential review standard should be applied). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
AH such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 5,2004, Arlene Nolen was arrested for Driving Under the Influence 
(DU1). Tt. 3. Based upon an administrative finding that she refused to submit to a 
chemical test after being requested and warned by the arresting officer, her driver's 
license was suspended pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (West 2004).2 R. 5. 
Nolen petitioned for judicial review of this decision on December 22,2004. R. 1-5. A 
bench trial was held on Nolen's petition on March 11,2005. R. 13-14,25-26; Tr. 1-64. 
The district court upheld the administrative decision to revoke the petitioner's 
driving privileges in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed on 
September 12,2005. R. 27-32. Nolen's notice of appeal was filed on September 20, 
2005. R. 36-37. 
2
 The current version of this statute is found at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (West 
Supp. 2005). 
3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the fact that Officer Parkin had probable cause to arrest 
Ms. Nolen for DUI. Tr. 2. They also stipulated to the facts concerning the necessary 
notices and admonitions being given to Ms. Nolen of the effect of her refusal to submit to 
a breathalyzer test. Tr. 1-3. The only issue remaining for trial was whether the petitioner 
had refused to take the breathalyzer test. Tr. 1. 
Officer Parkin testified that he instructed the petitioner about the breathalyzer test 
and how to perform it. Tr. 3. He read her a warning that "[i]f you refuse the test or fail to 
follow my instructions the test will not be given; however, I must warn you that your 
driving privilege may be revoked for 18 months for a first refusal..." Tr. 6. Ms. Nolen 
verbally agreed to take the test. Tr. 7. The officer explained to the petitioner: 
that I was going to have her again seal her lips around the end of a plastic 
mouth piece. I told her that when I instructed her to blow that she was 
required to blow for at least four to five seconds. I informed her to take a 
deep breath. When she started to blow and she provided a sufficient 
sample, she would hear a steady constant tone. I advised her again that she 
needed to blow hard enough to maintain that steady constant tone for the 
four to five seconds. 
Tr. 7-8. 
Officer Parkin testified that Nolen did not follow his instructions. At first she 
seemed to be spitting into the machine instead of blowing into it. Tr. 8. Even after she 
stopped spitting, she would stop blowing as soon as she got a constant tone instead of 
maintaining the tone for four to five seconds. Id. The officer continued to re-instruct the 
4 
petitioner, but she did not follow his instructions. Tr. 8-9. The machine has an automatic 
three minute period in which the sample is to be collected. "At the end of the three 
minutes sufficient sample was not obtained and so the machine at that point in time 
produced a readout for an insufficient sample . . . " Tr. 9. 
At no time did Ms. Nolen inform Officer Parkin that she was having any difficulty 
with performing the test or that she was physically incapable of providing a sample. Tr. 
9, 20. The test requires a minimum of one liter of breath and, in Officer Parkin's 
experience, it is not very difficult for an individual to perform this test. Tr. 20. Officer 
Parkin testified that Ms. Nolen was not hyperventilating. She was not having a hard time 
breathing. Tr. 21-22. Officer Parkin believed that she could not provide an adequate 
sample because she was unwilling to do so. Tr. 22. That Ms. Nolen was unwilling to 
perform the test as instructed. 
Ms. Nolen testified that she was physically incapable of providing a sample. Tr. 
39-41. She testified that, because of fear, she would suck in air as she was trying to 
breath into the machine. Tr. 40. Officer Parkin's testimony contradicted that of Ms. 
Nolen. 
A. No, again, my observation was is that she would begin to blow. 
She would blow hard enough or consistent enough to hear the tone. Once 
she heard the tone then she would stop. She would continue to blow, again 
blow hard enough to hear the tone and then would stop. It didn't appear to 
me that she was trying to breath in during the test. 
Q. Did it appear to you she was having trouble breathing at all during the 
test? 
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A. No, it did not. 
Q. Did it appear to you that she was really scared in her words, so scared 
during this test? 
A. No, it did not. 
Tr. 42-43. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court found the testimony of Officer Parkin to be more credible than 
that of Ms. Nolen. This factual finding has not been challenged on appeal. Petitioner has 
not marshaled the evidence that supports the district court's finding. And yet the 
petitioner asks this Court to reverse the district court based on this rejected testimony. 
The legal issue raised by the petitioner should be decided based upon the factual findings 
made by the district court, and not based on evidence that was found not to be credible. 
The objective facts found by the district court support the legal conclusion that the 
petitioner refused to perform the breathalyzer test. While she verbally agreed to take the 
test, she then refused to follow the instructions and perform the test correctly. Her 
conduct was correctly determined to amount to a refusal that justified the suspension of 
her driver's license. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER ERRS BY RELYING UPON TESTIMONY THAT 
WAS FOUND TO LACK CREDIBILITY BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT WHERE THIS FINDING OF FACT HAS NOT BEEN 
CHALLENGED ON APPEAL 
In claiming that her conduct did not show that she intentionally refused to perform 
the breathalyzer test, Ms. Nolen relies upon her testimony that she could not physically 
perform the test because of fear and inability to adequately breathe. Brief of Appellant at 
8-12. While this was her testimony (Tr. 39-41), it was found to lack credibility by the 
district court. The district court believed the testimony of Officer Parkin over that of the 
petitioner. R. 30; Tr. 62. 
Petitioner has not challenged this factual finding by the district court. Ms. Nolen 
has failed to marshal the evidence in support of this factual finding and cannot challenge 
it on appeal. A party challenging the district court's factual findings has a duty to marshal 
the evidence. 
It is the Plaintiffs* responsibility to marshal the evidence to 
demonstrate that the factual findings made by the trial court were erroneous. 
Specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to "marshal all the 
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." 
Save Our Schs. 2005 UT 55 at f 10 (citation omitted); see also Covey v. Covev. 2003 UT 
App 380, Tf27, 80 P.3d 553 ("In order to successfully challenge the trial court's findings of 
fact, Almon 'must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding[s] and then 
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demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding[s] even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.5") . 
Instead of marshaling the evidence supporting the district court's credibility 
finding, and demonstrating that the finding was not supported by sufficient evidence, Ms. 
Nolen instead simply relies on her rejected testimony. 
Because petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence that supports the factual 
finding of the district court, that finding should be affirmed on appeal. 
II. BY HER ACTIONS, THE PETITIONER REFUSED TO TAKE 
THE BREATHALYZER TEST AND HER DRIVER'S LICENSE 
WAS PROPERLY SUSPENDED 
In determining whether or not a driver has refused to perform a chemical test as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (West 2004) the courts review the driver's 
conduct objectively. 
Obviously the arresting officer cannot know the subjective state of 
mind of the person arrested and whether he in fact intended his response to 
a request to take a blood test to be the equivalent of a refusal that would 
result in license revocation. The test must be objective; otherwise the 
whole statutory scheme could be subverted by one who equivocates or 
remains silent, and later protests that it was his unexpressed intent to take 
the test. However, the behavior of the driver must clearly indicate, judged 
objectively, that the driver intended to refuse to take the test. 
Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331,1333 (Utah 1979). It is not necessary that the refusal to 
take the test be verbal. "It is sufficient if the behavior of the driver indicates his intention 
to refuse." Conrad v. Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984). It "may be implied 
8 
from the driver's conduct, words, and behavior." Lee v. Schwendiman. 722 P.2d 766, 
767 (Utah 1986). 
The facts, as found by the district court, support the legal conclusion that Ms. 
Nolen refused to take the test. While she verbally agreed to take the test, her actions and 
conduct demonstrated a refusal to perform the test. She spit into the machine instead of 
breathing into it. R. 29, 30; Tr. 8. She failed to follow instructions as to how long to 
blow into the machine, even though they were repeated several times. Tr. 7-9, 42. At no 
time did she tell Officer Parkin that she was having physical difficulty in taking the test. 
R. 29, 30; Tr. 9, 20. Objectively, it did not appear to Officer Parkin that Ms. Nolen was 
having trouble breathing during the test. Tr. 42. 
The district court accepted Officer Parkin's testimony as being more credible than 
that of Ms. Nolen. R. 30. Ms. Nolen's coriduct, as found by the district court, clearly 
showed her intent to refuse to take the test. The fact that she said she was willing to take 
the test does not alter this conclusion. Indeed, to give the statements of a driver more 
importance than her actual conduct would emasculate the statute. 
Plaintiff, however, presses upon us the argument that under the law a 
refusal must be an express, unequivocal refusal before a drivers license 
may be revoked. 
This interpretation of the statute would effectively emasculate it and 
is without foundation in authority or logic. If this argument were accepted, 
any person driving under the influence of alcohol could avoid having his 
license revoked by temporizing, equivocating, or simply remaining silent, as 
the facts of this case clearly illustrate. 
Beckv. Cox. 597P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1979). 
9 
Petitioner's claim that her verbal agreement to take the test should weigh more 
heavily than her objective actions, that showed she refused to take the test, would lead to 
the same erroneous result. By simply agreeing to take the test, and then failing to perforrti 
it properly, a driver could circumvent the statute. The district court correctly considered 
the actions of the petitioner and found that they constituted a failure to take the test. 
Nor is the fact that the petitioner asked to be allowed to try again, after the 
machine had shut down, change the fact that she had refused to take the test. "There is no 
merit to plaintiffs contention that his belated request to take the breathalyzer test cured 
his earlier refusal." Conrad v. Schwendiman. 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984). Ms. Nolen 
was given the opportunity to perform the test. Her actions show that she chose not to do 
so. The district court did not err when it determined that, based on its factual findings, 
the petitioner had refused to perform the test. Its dismissal of this petition should 
therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this Court to affirm the dismissal of 
this action. 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided by this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument 
10 
or a published opinion is necessary, though respondent desires to participate in oral 
argument if such is held by the Court. 
^ r . Respectfully submitted this /3 day of January, 2006 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this /^j> day of January, 
2006: 
GLEN W. NEELEY 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
§41-6-44.8 MOTOR VEHICLES 
plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one or more of 
those sections or ordinances. 
Laws 1983, c. 102, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 138, § 40; Laws 1990, c. 299, § 2; Laws 1991, c 
147, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 34; Laws 1994, c. 180, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 47, § 1, eff 
April 29, 1996, Laws 1996, c. 71, § 2, eff. July 1, 1996. 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 . Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug-
Number of tests—Refusal—Warning, report—Hearing, revocation of li-
cense—Appeal—Person incapable of refusal—Results of test available— 
Who may give test—Evidence 
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have 
given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, 
blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 
53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, oi 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having 
any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in 
the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that 
person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of 
a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6 
(b)(i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and 
how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though the person does submit to 
any other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c)(i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids 
may not select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific 
chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, 
and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by 
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
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Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person 
shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a reftisal to 
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's license to 
operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person do^s not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace 
officer be administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License 
Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver License 
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a 
motor vehicle. When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver 
License Division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from 
the date of arrest; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License 
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the 
Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner 
specified by the Driver License Division, also serve as the temporary license 
certificate. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, 
within ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided under 
Subsection (2)(b), that the peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested 
person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited 
under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite 
of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 
41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or 
tests under Subsection (1). 
(e)(i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke the person's license under this section is entitled to a 
hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten 
calendar days after the day on which notice is provided. 
(iii) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, 
the Driver License Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be 
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver 
License Division under this Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
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(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previown 
ten years from the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44,6! 
53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous i$g 
years from the date of arrest under Section 41-6-44. 
(f)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(ii), if a hearing is requested by 
the person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in 
the county in which the offense occurred. 
(ii) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other couniv 
if the Driver License Division and the person both agree, 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe thai k 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44* 
41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
(h)(i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent? 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance 
of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace offl* 
cers. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from 
the Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Sec 
tion 78-46-28. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the 
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused i© 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division shall 
revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i)(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous 
ten years from the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44 6, 
53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or 
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten 
years from the date of arrest under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in 
addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under 
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege 
is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
decision following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that th£ 
revocation was improper. 
(j)(i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver Licenim 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
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(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering 
the person incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is 
considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), 
and the test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested 
or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to the person. 
(5)(a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person author-
ized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does 
not apply to taking a urine , breath, or oral fluid specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized 
under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a 
sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe 
is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which 
the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising 
from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard 
medical practice. 
(6)(a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a 
physician of the person's own choice administer a chemical test in addition to 
the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace 
officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered 
at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of 
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
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